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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge 
 This appeal raises a novel question of bankruptcy law: 
may a case arising under Chapter 11 ever be resolved in a 
 5 
 
“structured dismissal” that deviates from the Bankruptcy 
Code’s priority system? We hold that, in a rare case, it may. 
 
I 
A 
 Jevic Transportation, Inc. was a trucking company 
headquartered in New Jersey. In 2006, after Jevic’s business 
began to decline, a subsidiary of the private equity firm Sun 
Capital Partners acquired the company in a leveraged buyout 
financed by a group of lenders led by CIT Group. The buyout 
entailed the extension of an $85 million revolving credit 
facility by CIT to Jevic, which Jevic could access as long as it 
maintained at least $5 million in assets and collateral. The 
company continued to struggle in the two years that followed, 
however, and had to reach a forbearance agreement with 
CIT—which included a $2 million guarantee by Sun—to 
prevent CIT from foreclosing on the assets securing the loans. 
By May 2008, with the company’s performance stagnant and 
the expiration of the forbearance agreement looming, Jevic’s 
board of directors authorized a bankruptcy filing. The 
company ceased substantially all of its operations, and its 
employees received notice of their impending terminations on 
May 19, 2008. 
 The next day, Jevic filed a voluntary Chapter 11 
petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District 
of Delaware. At that point, Jevic owed about $53 million to 
its first-priority senior secured creditors (CIT and Sun) and 
over $20 million to its tax and general unsecured creditors. In 
June 2008, an Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors 
(Committee) was appointed to represent the unsecured 
creditors. 
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 This appeal stems from two lawsuits that were filed in 
the Bankruptcy Court during those proceedings. First, a group 
of Jevic’s terminated truck drivers (Drivers) filed a class 
action against Jevic and Sun alleging violations of federal and 
state Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification 
(WARN) Acts, under which Jevic was required to provide 60 
days’ written notice to its employees before laying them off. 
See 29 U.S.C. § 2102; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:21-2. Meanwhile, 
the Committee brought a fraudulent conveyance action 
against CIT and Sun on the estate’s behalf, alleging that Sun, 
with CIT’s assistance, “acquired Jevic with virtually none of 
its own money based on baseless projections of almost 
immediate growth and increasing profitability.” App. 770 
(Second Am. Compl. ¶ 1). The Committee claimed that the 
ill-advised leveraged buyout had hastened Jevic’s bankruptcy 
by saddling it with debts that it couldn’t service and described 
Jevic’s demise as “the foreseeable end of a reckless course of 
action in which Sun and CIT bore no risk but all other 
constituents did.” App. 794 (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 128). 
 Almost three years after the Committee sued CIT and 
Sun for fraudulent conveyance, the Bankruptcy Court granted 
in part and denied in part CIT’s motion to dismiss the case. 
The Court held that the Committee had adequately pleaded 
claims of fraudulent transfer and preferential transfer under 
11 U.S.C. §§ 548 and 547. Noting the “great potential for 
abuse” in leveraged buyouts, the Court concluded that the 
Committee had sufficiently alleged that CIT had played a 
critical role in facilitating a series of transactions that 
recklessly reduced Jevic’s equity, increased its debt, and 
shifted the risk of loss to its other creditors. In re Jevic 
Holding Corp., 2011 WL 4345204, at *10 (Bankr. D. Del. 
Sept. 15, 2011) (quoting Moody v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 
971 F.2d 1056, 1073 (3d Cir. 1992)). The Court dismissed 
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without prejudice the Committee’s claims for fraudulent 
transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 544, for equitable subordination of 
CIT’s claims against the estate, and for aiding and abetting 
Jevic’s officers and directors in breaching their fiduciary 
duties, because the Committee’s allegations in support of 
these claims were too sparse and vague. 
 In March 2012, representatives of all the major 
players—the Committee, CIT, Sun, the Drivers, and what was 
left of Jevic—convened to negotiate a settlement of the 
Committee’s fraudulent conveyance suit. By that time, Jevic’s 
only remaining assets were $1.7 million in cash (which was 
subject to Sun’s lien) and the action against CIT and Sun. All 
of Jevic’s tangible assets had been liquidated to repay the 
lender group led by CIT. According to testimony in the 
Bankruptcy Court, the Committee determined that a 
settlement ensuring “a modest distribution to unsecured 
creditors” was desirable in light of “the risk and the [re]wards 
of litigation, including the prospect of waiting for perhaps 
many years before a litigation against Sun and CIT could be 
resolved” and the lack of estate funds sufficient to finance 
that litigation. App. 1275. 
 In the end, the Committee, Jevic, CIT, and Sun 
reached a settlement agreement that accomplished four 
things. First, those parties would exchange releases of their 
claims against each other and the fraudulent conveyance 
action would be dismissed with prejudice. Second, CIT would 
pay $2 million into an account earmarked to pay Jevic’s and 
the Committee’s legal fees and other administrative expenses. 
Third, Sun would assign its lien on Jevic’s remaining $1.7 
million to a trust, which would pay tax and administrative 
creditors first and then the general unsecured creditors on a 
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pro rata basis.1 Lastly, Jevic’s Chapter 11 case would be 
dismissed. The parties’ settlement thus contemplated a 
structured dismissal, a disposition that winds up the 
bankruptcy with certain conditions attached instead of simply 
dismissing the case and restoring the status quo ante. See In 
re Strategic Labor, Inc., 467 B.R. 11, 17 n.10 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 2012) (“Unlike the old-fashioned one sentence 
dismissal orders—‘this case is hereby dismissed’—structured 
dismissal orders often include some or all of the following 
additional provisions: ‘releases (some more limited than 
others), protocols for reconciling and paying claims, “gifting” 
of funds to unsecured creditors[, etc.]’” (citation omitted)). 
 There was just one problem with the settlement: it left 
out the Drivers, even though they had an uncontested WARN 
Act claim against Jevic.2 The Drivers never got the chance to 
present a damages case in the Bankruptcy Court, but they 
estimate their claim to have been worth $12,400,000, of 
                                                 
1 This component of the agreement originally would 
have paid all $1.7 million to the general unsecured creditors, 
but the United States Trustee, certain priority tax creditors, 
and the Drivers objected. The general unsecured creditors 
ultimately received almost four percent of their claims under 
the settlement. 
2 Although Sun was eventually granted summary 
judgment in the WARN Act litigation because it did not 
qualify as an employer of the Drivers, In re Jevic Holding 
Corp., 492 B.R. 416, 425 (Bankr. D. Del. 2013), the 
Bankruptcy Court entered summary judgment against Jevic 
because it had “undisputed[ly]” violated the state WARN Act, 
In re Jevic Holding Corp., 496 B.R. 151, 165 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2013). 
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which $8,300,000 was a priority wage claim under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 507(a)(4). See Drivers’ Br. 6 & n.3; In re Powermate 
Holding Corp., 394 B.R. 765, 773 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008) 
(“Courts have consistently held that WARN Act damages are 
within ‘the nature of wages’ for which § 507(a)(4) 
provides.”). The record is not explicit as to why the 
settlement did not provide for any payment to the Drivers 
even though they held claims of higher priority than the tax 
and trade creditors’ claims.3 It seems that the Drivers and the 
other parties were unable to agree on a settlement of the 
WARN Act claim, and Sun was unwilling to pay the Drivers 
as long as the WARN Act lawsuit continued because Sun was 
a defendant in those proceedings and did not want to fund 
litigation against itself.4 The settling parties also accept the 
                                                 
3 For example, Jevic’s chief restructuring officer 
opaquely testified in the Bankruptcy Court: “There was no 
decision not to pay the WARN claimants. There was a 
decision to settle certain proceedings amongst parties. The 
WARN claimants were part of that group of people that 
decided to create a settlement. So there was no decision not to 
pay the WARN claimants.” App. 1258. 
4 Sun’s counsel acknowledged as much in the 
Bankruptcy Court, stating: 
[I]t doesn’t take testimony for Your Honor . . . 
to figure out, Sun probably does care where the 
money goes because you can take judicial 
notice that there’s a pending WARN action 
against Sun by the WARN plaintiffs. And if the 
money goes to the WARN plaintiffs, then 
you’re funding somebody who is suing you who 
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Drivers’ contention that it was “the paramount interest of the 
Committee to negotiate a deal under which the [Drivers] were 
excluded” because a settlement that paid the Drivers’ priority 
claim would have left the Committee’s constituents with 
nothing. Appellees’ Br. 26 (quoting Drivers’ Br. 28). 
B 
 The Drivers and the United States Trustee objected to 
the proposed settlement and dismissal mainly because it 
distributed property of the estate to creditors of lower priority 
than the Drivers under § 507 of the Bankruptcy Code. The 
Trustee also objected on the ground that the Code does not 
permit structured dismissals, while the Drivers further argued 
that the Committee breached its fiduciary duty to the estate by 
“agreeing to a settlement that, effectively, freezes out the 
[Drivers].” App. 30–31 (Bankr. Op. 8–9). The Bankruptcy 
Court rejected these objections in an oral opinion approving 
the proposed settlement and dismissal.  
 The Bankruptcy Court began by recognizing the 
absence of any “provision in the code for distribution and 
dismissal contemplated by the settlement motion,” but it 
noted that similar relief has been granted by other courts. 
App. 31 (Bankr. Op. 9). Summarizing its assessment, the 
                                                                                                             
otherwise doesn’t have funds and is doing it on 
a contingent fee basis. 
App. 1363; accord Appellees’ Br. 26. This is the only reason 
that appears in the record for why the settlement did not 
provide for either direct payment to the Drivers or the 
assignment of Sun’s lien on Jevic’s remaining cash to the 
estate rather than to a liquidating trust earmarked for 
everybody but the Drivers. 
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Court found that “the dire circumstances that are present in 
this case warrant the relief requested here by the Debtor, the 
Committee and the secured lenders.” Id. The Court went on to 
make findings establishing those dire circumstances. It found 
that there was “no realistic prospect” of a meaningful 
distribution to anyone but the secured creditors unless the 
settlement were approved because the traditional routes out of 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy were impracticable. App. 32 (Bankr. 
Op. 10). First, there was “no prospect” of a confirmable 
Chapter 11 plan of reorganization or liquidation being filed. 
Id. Second, conversion to liquidation under Chapter 7 of the 
Bankruptcy Code would have been unavailing for any party 
because a Chapter 7 trustee would not have had sufficient 
funds “to operate, investigate or litigate” (since all the cash 
left in the estate was encumbered) and the secured creditors 
had “stated unequivocally and credibly that they would not do 
this deal in a Chapter 7.” Id. 
 The Bankruptcy Court then rejected the objectors’ 
argument that the settlement could not be approved because it 
distributed estate assets in violation of the Code’s “absolute 
priority rule.” After noting that Chapter 11 plans must comply 
with the Code’s priority scheme, the Court held that 
settlements need not do so. The Court also disagreed with the 
Drivers’ fiduciary duty argument, dismissing the notion that 
the Committee’s fiduciary duty to the estate gave each 
creditor veto power over any proposed settlement. The 
Drivers were never barred from participating in the settlement 
negotiations, the Court observed, and their omission from the 
settlement distribution would not prejudice them because 
their claims against the Jevic estate were “effectively 
worthless” since the estate lacked any unencumbered funds. 
App. 36 (Bankr. Op. 14). 
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 Finally, the Bankruptcy Court applied the multifactor 
test of In re Martin, 91 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 1996), for 
evaluating settlements under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy 
Procedure 9019. It found that the Committee’s likelihood of 
success in the fraudulent conveyance action was “uncertain at 
best,” given the legal hurdles to recovery, the substantial 
resources of CIT and Sun, and the scarcity of funds in the 
estate to finance further litigation. App. 34–35 (Bankr. Op. 
12–13). The Court highlighted the complexity of the litigation 
and expressed its skepticism that new counsel or a Chapter 7 
trustee could be retained to continue the fraudulent 
conveyance suit on a contingent fee basis. App. 35–36 
(Bankr. Op. 13–14) (“[O]n these facts I think any lawyer or 
firm that signed up for that role should have his head 
examined.”). Faced with, in its view, either “a meaningful 
return or zero,” the Court decided that “[t]he paramount 
interest of the creditors mandates approval of the settlement” 
and nothing in the Bankruptcy Code dictated otherwise. App. 
36 (Bankr. Op. 14). The Bankruptcy Court therefore approved 
the settlement and dismissed Jevic’s Chapter 11 case. 
C 
 The Drivers appealed to the United States District 
Court for the District of Delaware and filed a motion in the 
Bankruptcy Court to stay its order pending appeal. The 
Bankruptcy Court denied the stay request, and the Drivers did 
not renew their request for a stay before the District Court. 
The parties began implementing the settlement months later, 
distributing over one thousand checks to priority tax creditors 
and general unsecured creditors. 
 The District Court subsequently affirmed the 
Bankruptcy Court’s approval of the settlement and dismissal 
of the case. The Court began by noting that the Drivers 
 13 
 
“largely do not contest the bankruptcy court’s factual 
findings.” Jevic Holding Corp., 2014 WL 268613, at *2 (D. 
Del. Jan. 24, 2014). In analyzing those factual findings, the 
District Court held, the Bankruptcy Court had correctly 
applied the Martin factors and determined that the proposed 
settlement was “fair and equitable.” Id. at *2–3. The Court 
also rejected the Drivers’ fiduciary duty and absolute priority 
rule arguments for the same reasons explained by the 
bankruptcy judge. Id. at *3. And even if the Bankruptcy Court 
had erred by approving the settlement and dismissing the 
case, the District Court held in the alternative that the appeal 
was equitably moot because the settlement had been 
“substantially consummated as all the funds have been 
distributed.” Id. at *4. The Drivers filed this timely appeal, 
with the United States Trustee supporting them as amicus 
curiae. 
II 
 The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 157(b), and the District Court had jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) and 1334. We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291. 
 “Because the District Court sat below as an appellate 
court, this Court conducts the same review of the Bankruptcy 
Court’s order as did the District Court.” In re Telegroup, Inc., 
281 F.3d 133, 136 (3d Cir. 2002). We review questions of law 
de novo, findings of fact for clear error, and exercises of 
discretion for abuse thereof. In re Goody’s Family Clothing 
Inc., 610 F.3d 812, 816 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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III 
 To the extent that the Bankruptcy Court had discretion 
to approve the structured dismissal at issue, the Drivers tacitly 
concede that the Court did not abuse that discretion in 
approving a settlement of the Committee’s action against CIT 
and Sun and dismissing Jevic’s Chapter 11 case.  
 First, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019 
expressly authorizes settlements as long as they are “fair and 
equitable.” Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT 
Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson (TMT Trailer Ferry), 390 U.S. 
414, 424 (1968). In Martin, we gleaned from TMT Trailer 
Ferry four factors to guide bankruptcy courts in this regard: 
“(1) the probability of success in litigation; (2) the likely 
difficulties in collection; (3) the complexity of the litigation 
involved, and the expense, inconvenience and delay 
necessarily attending it; and (4) the paramount interest of the 
creditors.” 91 F.3d at 393. None of the objectors contends that 
the Bankruptcy Court erred in concluding that the balance of 
these factors favors settlement, and we agree. Although the 
Committee’s fraudulent conveyance suit survived a motion to 
dismiss, it was far from compelling, especially in view of 
CIT’s and Sun’s substantial resources and the Committee’s 
lack thereof. App. 35 (Bankr. Op. 13); see App. 1273 
(summarizing expert testimony CIT planned to offer that 
Jevic’s failure was caused by systemic economic and 
industrial problems, not the leveraged buyout); In re World 
Health Alts., Inc., 344 B.R. 291, 302 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) 
(“[S]uccessful challenges to a pre-petition first lien creditor’s 
position are unusual, if not rare.”). The litigation promised to 
be complex and lengthy, whereas the settlement offered most 
of Jevic’s creditors actual distributions.  
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 Nor do the Drivers dispute that the Bankruptcy Court 
generally followed the law with respect to dismissal. A 
bankruptcy court may dismiss a Chapter 11 case “for cause,” 
and one form of cause contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code 
is “substantial or continuing loss to or diminution of the estate 
and the absence of a reasonable likelihood of 
rehabilitation[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1), (b)(4)(A). By the 
time the settling parties requested dismissal, the estate was 
almost entirely depleted and there was no chance of a plan of 
reorganization being confirmed. But for $1.7 million in 
encumbered cash and the fraudulent conveyance action, Jevic 
had nothing. 
 Instead of challenging the Bankruptcy Court’s 
discretionary judgments as to the propriety of a settlement 
and dismissal, the Drivers and the United States Trustee argue 
that the Bankruptcy Court did not have the discretion it 
purported to exercise. Specifically, they claim bankruptcy 
courts have no legal authority to approve structured 
dismissals, at least to the extent they deviate from the priority 
system of the Bankruptcy Code in distributing estate assets. 
We disagree and hold that bankruptcy courts may, in rare 
instances like this one, approve structured dismissals that do 
not strictly adhere to the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme. 
A 
We begin by considering whether structured dismissals 
are ever permissible under the Bankruptcy Code. The Drivers 
submit that “Chapter 11 provides debtors only three exits 
from bankruptcy”: confirmation of a plan of reorganization, 
conversion to Chapter 7 liquidation, or plain dismissal with 
no strings attached. Drivers’ Br. 18. They argue that there is 
no statutory authority for structured dismissals and that “[t]he 
Bankruptcy Court admitted as much.” Id. at 44. They cite a 
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provision of the Code and accompanying legislative history 
indicating that Congress understood the ordinary effect of 
dismissal to be reversion to the status quo ante. Id. at 45 
(citing 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(3); H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 
1st Sess. 338 (1977)). 
 The Drivers are correct that, as the Bankruptcy Court 
acknowledged, the Code does not expressly authorize 
structured dismissals. See App. 31 (Bankr. Op. 9). And as 
structured dismissals have occurred with increased 
frequency,5 even commentators who seem to favor this trend 
have expressed uncertainty about whether the Code permits 
them.6 As we understand them, however, structured 
dismissals are simply dismissals that are preceded by other 
orders of the bankruptcy court (e.g., orders approving 
                                                 
5 See Norman L. Pernick & G. David Dean, Structured 
Chapter 11 Dismissals: A Viable and Growing Alternative 
After Asset Sales, Am. Bankr. Inst. J., June 2010, at 1; see, 
e.g., In re Kainos Partners Holding Co., 2012 WL 6028927 
(D. Del. Nov. 30, 2012); World Health Alts., 344 B.R. at 293–
95. But cf. In re Biolitec, Inc., 2014 WL 7205395 (Bankr. 
D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2014) (rejecting a proposed structured 
dismissal as invalid under the Code). 
6 See, e.g., Brent Weisenberg, Expediting Chapter 11 
Liquidating Debtor’s Distribution to Creditors, Am. Bankr. 
Inst. J., April 2012, at 36 (“[T]he time is ripe to make crystal 
clear that these procedures are in fact authorized by the 
Code.”). But cf. Nan Roberts Eitel et al., Structured 
Dismissals, or Cases Dismissed Outside of Code’s Structure?, 
Am. Bankr. Inst. J., March 2011, at 20 (article by United 
States Trustee staff arguing that structured dismissals are 
improper under the Code). 
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settlements, granting releases, and so forth) that remain in 
effect after dismissal. And though § 349 of the Code 
contemplates that dismissal will typically reinstate the pre-
petition state of affairs by revesting property in the debtor and 
vacating orders and judgments of the bankruptcy court, it also 
explicitly authorizes the bankruptcy court to alter the effect of 
dismissal “for cause”—in other words, the Code does not 
strictly require dismissal of a Chapter 11 case to be a hard 
reset. 11 U.S.C. § 349(b); H.R. Rep. No. 595 at 338 (“The 
court is permitted to order a different result for cause.”); see 
also Matter of Sadler, 935 F.2d 918, 921 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(“‘Cause’ under § 349(b) means an acceptable reason.”). 
 Quoting Justice Scalia’s oft-repeated quip “Congress 
. . . does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes,” 
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001), 
the Drivers forcefully argue that Congress would have spoken 
more clearly if it had intended to leave open an end run 
around the procedures that govern plan confirmation and 
conversion to Chapter 7, Drivers’ Br. 22. According to the 
Drivers, the position of the District Court, the Bankruptcy 
Court, and Appellees overestimates the breadth of bankruptcy 
courts’ settlement-approval power under Rule 9019, 
“render[ing] plan confirmation superfluous” and paving the 
way for illegitimate sub rosa plans engineered by creditors 
with overwhelming bargaining power. Id.; see also id. at 24–
25. Neither “dire circumstances” nor the bankruptcy courts’ 
general power to carry out the provisions of the Code under 
11 U.S.C. § 105(a), the Drivers say, authorizes a court to 
evade the Code’s requirements. Id. at 32–35, 40–41. 
 But even if we accept all that as true, the Drivers have 
proved only that the Code forbids structured dismissals when 
they are used to circumvent the plan confirmation process or 
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conversion to Chapter 7. Here, the Drivers mount no real 
challenge to the Bankruptcy Court’s findings that there was 
no prospect of a confirmable plan in this case and that 
conversion to Chapter 7 was a bridge to nowhere. So this 
appeal does not require us to decide whether structured 
dismissals are permissible when a confirmable plan is in the 
offing or conversion to Chapter 7 might be worthwhile. For 
present purposes, it suffices to say that absent a showing that 
a structured dismissal has been contrived to evade the 
procedural protections and safeguards of the plan 
confirmation or conversion processes, a bankruptcy court has 
discretion to order such a disposition. 
B 
 Having determined that bankruptcy courts have the 
power, in appropriate circumstances, to approve structured 
dismissals, we now consider whether settlements in that 
context may ever skip a class of objecting creditors in favor 
of more junior creditors. See In re Buffet Partners, L.P., 2014 
WL 3735804, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. July 28, 2014) 
(approving a structured dismissal while “emphasiz[ing] that 
not one party with an economic stake in the case has objected 
to the dismissal in this manner”). The Drivers’ primary 
argument in this regard is that even if structured dismissals 
are permissible, they cannot be approved if they distribute 
estate assets in derogation of the priority scheme of § 507 of 
the Code. They contend that § 507 applies to all distributions 
of estate property under Chapter 11, meaning the Bankruptcy 
Court was powerless to approve a settlement that skipped 
priority employee creditors in favor of tax and general 
unsecured creditors. Drivers’ Br. 21, 35–36; see 11 U.S.C. 
§ 103(a) (“[C]hapters 1, 3, and 5 of this title apply in a case 
under chapter 7, 11, 12, or 13[.]”); Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 
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1188, 1194 (2014) (“‘[W]hatever equitable powers remain in 
the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within 
the confines of’ the Bankruptcy Code.” (citation omitted)). 
 The Drivers’ argument is not without force. Although 
we are skeptical that § 103(a) requires settlements in Chapter 
11 cases to strictly comply with the § 507 priorities,7 there is 
some tacit support in the caselaw for the Drivers’ position. 
For example, in TMT Trailer Ferry, the Supreme Court held 
that the “requirement[] . . . that plans of reorganization be 
both ‘fair and equitable,’ appl[ies] to compromises just as to 
other aspects of reorganizations.” 390 U.S. at 424. The Court 
also noted that “a bankruptcy court is not to approve or 
confirm a plan of reorganization unless it is found to be ‘fair 
and equitable.’ This standard incorporates the absolute 
priority doctrine under which creditors and stockholders may 
participate only in accordance with their respective 
priorities[.]” Id. at 441; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) 
(codifying the absolute priority rule by requiring that a plan 
of reorganization pay senior creditors before junior creditors 
in order to be “fair and equitable” and confirmable). This 
latter statement comports with a line of cases describing “fair 
                                                 
7 There is nothing in the Code indicating that Congress 
legislated with settlements in mind—in fact, the bankruptcy 
courts’ power to approve settlements comes from a Federal 
Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure promulgated by the Supreme 
Court, not Congress. See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2075. If § 103(a) meant that all distributions in Chapter 11 
cases must comply with the priorities of § 507, there would 
have been no need for Congress to codify the absolute 
priority rule specifically in the plan confirmation context. See 
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
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and equitable” as “‘words of art’ which mean that senior 
interests are entitled to full priority over junior ones[.]” SEC 
v. Am. Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 611 (1965); accord 
Otis & Co. v. SEC, 323 U.S. 624, 634 (1945); Case v. L.A. 
Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115–16 (1939). 
 Although these cases provide some support to the 
Drivers, they are not dispositive because each of them spoke 
in the context of plans of reorganization, not settlements. See, 
e.g., TMT Trailer Ferry, 424 U.S. at 441; Am. Trailer 
Rentals, 379 U.S. at 611; see also In re Armstrong World 
Indus., Inc., 432 F.3d 507 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying the 
absolute priority rule to deny confirmation of a proposed 
plan). When Congress codified the absolute priority rule 
discussed in the line of Supreme Court decisions cited above, 
it did so in the specific context of plan confirmation, see 
§ 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), and neither Congress nor the Supreme 
Court has ever said that the rule applies to settlements in 
bankruptcy. Indeed, the Drivers themselves admit that the 
absolute priority rule “plainly does not apply here,” even as 
they insist that the legal principle embodied by the rule 
dictates a result in their favor. Drivers’ Br. 37. 
 Two of our sister courts have grappled with whether 
the priority scheme of § 507 must be followed when 
settlement proceeds are distributed in Chapter 11 cases. In 
Matter of AWECO, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit rejected a settlement of a lawsuit against a Chapter 11 
debtor that would have transferred $5.3 million in estate 
assets to an unsecured creditor despite the existence of 
outstanding senior claims. 725 F.2d 293, 295–96 (1984). The 
Court held that the “fair and equitable” standard applies to 
settlements, and “fair and equitable” means compliant with 
the priority system. Id. at 298. 
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 Criticizing the Fifth Circuit’s rule in AWECO, the 
Second Circuit adopted a more flexible approach in In re 
Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452 (2007). There, the 
unsecured creditors’ committee sought to settle a suit it had 
brought on the estate’s behalf against a group of secured 
lenders; the proposed settlement split the estate’s cash 
between the lenders and a litigation trust set up to fund a 
different debtor action against Motorola, a priority 
administrative creditor. Id. at 456, 459–60. Motorola objected 
to the settlement on the ground that the distribution violated 
the Code’s priority system by skipping Motorola and 
distributing funds to lower-priority creditors. Id. at 456. 
Rejecting the approach taken by the Fifth Circuit in AWECO 
as “too rigid,” the Second Circuit held that the absolute 
priority rule “is not necessarily implicated” when “a 
settlement is presented for court approval apart from a 
reorganization plan[.]” Id. at 463–64. The Court held that 
“whether a particular settlement’s distribution scheme 
complies with the Code’s priority scheme must be the most 
important factor for the bankruptcy court to consider when 
determining whether a settlement is ‘fair and equitable’ under 
Rule 9019,” but a noncompliant settlement could be approved 
when “the remaining factors weigh heavily in favor of 
approving a settlement[.]” Id. at 464. 
 Applying its holding to the facts of the case, the 
Second Circuit noted that the settlement at issue deviated 
from the Code priorities in two respects: first, by skipping 
Motorola in distributing estate assets to the litigation fund 
created to finance the unsecured creditors committee’s suit 
against Motorola; and second, by skipping Motorola again in 
providing that any money remaining in the fund after the 
litigation concluded would go straight to the unsecured 
creditors. 478 F.3d at 459, 465–66. The Court indicated that 
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the first deviation was acceptable even though it skipped 
Motorola: 
It is clear from the record why the Settlement 
distributes money from the Estate to the 
[litigation vehicle]. The alternative to settling 
with the Lenders—pursuing the challenge to the 
Lenders’ liens—presented too much risk for the 
Estate, including the administrative creditors. If 
the Estate lost against the Lenders (after years 
of litigation and paying legal fees), the Estate 
would be devastated, all its cash and remaining 
assets liquidated, and the Lenders would still 
possess a lien over the Motorola Estate Action. 
Similarly, administrative creditors would not be 
paid if the Estate was unsuccessful against the 
Lenders. Further, as noted at the Settlement 
hearing, having a well-funded litigation trust 
was preferable to attempting to procure 
contingent fee-based representation. 
Id. at 465–66. But because the record did not adequately 
explain the second deviation, the Court remanded the case to 
allow the bankruptcy court to consider that issue. Id. at 466 
(“[N]o reason has been offered to explain why any balance 
left in the litigation trust could not or should not be 
distributed pursuant to the rule of priorities.”). 
 We agree with the Second Circuit’s approach in 
Iridium—which, we note, the Drivers and the United States 
Trustee cite throughout their briefs and never quarrel with. 
See Drivers’ Br. 27, 36; Reply Br. 11–13; Trustee Br. 21. As 
in other areas of the law, settlements are favored in 
bankruptcy. In re Nutraquest, 434 F.3d 639, 644 (3d Cir. 
2006). “Indeed, it is an unusual case in which there is not 
 23 
 
some litigation that is settled between the representative of 
the estate and an adverse party.” Martin, 91 F.3d at 393. 
Given the “dynamic status of some pre-plan bankruptcy 
settlements,” Iridium, 478 F.3d at 464, it would make sense 
for the Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 
Procedure to leave bankruptcy courts more flexibility in 
approving settlements than in confirming plans of 
reorganization. For instance, if a settlement is proposed 
during the early stages of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the 
“nature and extent of the [e]state and the claims against it” 
may be unresolved. Id. at 464. The inquiry outlined in Iridium 
better accounts for these concerns, we think, than does the per 
se rule of AWECO. 
 At the same time, we agree with the Second Circuit’s 
statement that compliance with the Code priorities will 
usually be dispositive of whether a proposed settlement is fair 
and equitable. Id. at 455. Settlements that skip objecting 
creditors in distributing estate assets raise justifiable concerns 
about collusion among debtors, creditors, and their attorneys 
and other professionals. See id. at 464. Although Appellees 
have persuaded us to hold that the Code and the Rules do not 
extend the absolute priority rule to settlements in bankruptcy, 
we think that the policy underlying that rule—ensuring the 
evenhanded and predictable treatment of creditors—applies in 
the settlement context. As the Drivers note, nothing in the 
Code or the Rules obliges a creditor to cut a deal in order to 
receive a distribution of estate assets to which he is entitled. 
Drivers’ Br. 42–43. If the “fair and equitable” standard is to 
have any teeth, it must mean that bankruptcy courts cannot 
approve settlements and structured dismissals devised by 
certain creditors in order to increase their shares of the estate 
at the expense of other creditors. We therefore hold that 
bankruptcy courts may approve settlements that deviate from 
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the priority scheme of § 507 of the Bankruptcy Code only if 
they have “specific and credible grounds to justify [the] 
deviation.” Iridium, 478 F.3d at 466. 
C 
 We admit that it is a close call, but in view of the 
foregoing, we conclude that the Bankruptcy Court had 
sufficient reason to approve the settlement and structured 
dismissal of Jevic’s Chapter 11 case. This disposition, 
unsatisfying as it was, remained the least bad alternative since 
there was “no prospect” of a plan being confirmed and 
conversion to Chapter 7 would have resulted in the secured 
creditors taking all that remained of the estate in “short 
order.” App. 32 (Bankr. Op. 10). 
 Our dissenting colleague’s contrary view rests on the 
counterfactual premise that the parties could have reached an 
agreeable settlement that conformed to the Code priorities. He 
would have us make a finding of fact to that effect and order 
the Bankruptcy Court to redesign the settlement to comply 
with § 507. We decline to do so because, even if it were 
appropriate for us to review findings of fact de novo and 
equitably reform settlements on appeal, there is no evidence 
calling into question the Bankruptcy Court’s conclusion that 
there was “no realistic prospect” of a meaningful distribution 
to Jevic’s unsecured creditors apart from the settlement under 
review. App. 32 (Bankr. Op. 10). If courts required 
settlements to be perfect, they would seldom be approved; 
though it’s regrettable that the Drivers were left out of this 
one, the question—as Judge Scirica recognizes—is whether 
the settlement serves the interests of the estate, not one 
particular group of creditors. There is no support in the record 
for the proposition that a viable alternative existed that would 
have better served the estate and the creditors as a whole. 
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 The distribution of Jevic’s remaining $1.7 million to 
all creditors but the Drivers was permissible for essentially 
the same reasons that the initial distribution of estate assets to 
the litigation fund was allowed by the Second Circuit in 
Iridium.8 As in that case, here the Bankruptcy Court had to 
choose between approving a settlement that deviated from the 
priority scheme of § 507 or rejecting it so a lawsuit could 
proceed to deplete the estate. Although we are troubled by the 
fact that the exclusion of the Drivers certainly lends an 
element of unfairness to the first option, the second option 
would have served the interests of neither the creditors nor 
the estate. The Bankruptcy Court, in Solomonic fashion, 
reluctantly approved the only course that resulted in some 
payment to creditors other than CIT and Sun. 
* * * 
 Counsel for the United States Trustee told the 
Bankruptcy Court that it is immaterial whether there is a 
viable alternative to a structured dismissal that does not 
                                                 
8 Judge Scirica reads Iridium as involving a settlement 
that deviated from the § 507 priority scheme in just one 
respect, and a minor one at that. As we have explained, 
however, the Iridium settlement involved two deviations: (1) 
the initial distribution of estate funds to the litigation fund 
created to sue Motorola; and (2) the contingent provision that 
money left in the fund after the litigation concluded would go 
directly to the unsecured creditors. See supra Section III-B. 
The Second Circuit held that, while the second deviation 
needed to be explained on remand, the first was acceptable 
despite the fact that it impaired Motorola because it clearly 
served the interests of the estate. See Iridium, 478 F.3d at 
465–66. 
 26 
 
comply with the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme. “[W]e 
have to accept the fact that we are sometimes going to get a 
really ugly result, an economically ugly result, but it’s an 
economically ugly result that is dictated by the provisions of 
the code,” he said. App. 1327. We doubt that our national 
bankruptcy policy is quite so nihilistic and distrustful of 
bankruptcy judges. Rather, we believe the Code permits a 
structured dismissal, even one that deviates from the § 507 
priorities, when a bankruptcy judge makes sound findings of 
fact that the traditional routes out of Chapter 11 are 
unavailable and the settlement is the best feasible way of 
serving the interests of the estate and its creditors. Although 
this result is likely to be justified only rarely, in this case the 
Bankruptcy Court provided sufficient reasons to support its 
approval of the settlement under Rule 9019. For that reason, 
we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
 SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
 I concur in parts of the Court’s analysis in this difficult 
case, but I respectfully dissent from the decision to affirm. 
Rejection of the settlement was called for under the 
Bankruptcy Code and, by approving the settlement, the 
bankruptcy court’s order undermined the Code’s essential 
priority scheme. Accordingly, I would vacate the bankruptcy 
court’s order and remand for further proceedings, described 
below. 
 
 At the outset, I should state that this is not a case 
where equitable mootness applies. We recently made clear in 
In re Semcrude, L.P., 728 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2013), that this 
doctrine applies only where there is a confirmed plan of 
reorganization. I would also adopt the Second Circuit’s 
standard from In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452 (2d 
Cir. 2007), and hold that settlements presented outside of plan 
confirmations must, absent extraordinary circumstances, 
comply with the Code’s priority scheme.  
 
Where I depart from the majority opinion, however, is 
in holding this appeal presents an extraordinary case where 
departure from the general rule is warranted. The bankruptcy 
court believed that because no confirmable Chapter 11 plan 
was possible, and because the only alternative to the 
settlement was a Chapter 7 liquidation in which the WARN 
Plaintiffs would have received no recovery, compliance with 
the Code’s priority scheme was not required. For two reasons, 
however, I respectfully dissent. 
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 First, it is not clear to me that the only alternative to 
the settlement was a Chapter 7 liquidation. An alternative 
settlement might have been reached in Chapter 11, and might 
have included the WARN Plaintiffs. The reason that such a 
settlement was not reached was that one of the defendants 
being released (Sun) did not want to fund the WARN 
Plaintiffs in their ongoing litigation against it. As Sun’s 
counsel explained at the settlement hearing, “if the money 
goes to the WARN plaintiffs, then you’re funding someone 
who is suing you who otherwise doesn’t have funds and is 
doing it on a contingent fee basis.” Sun therefore insisted that, 
as a condition to participating in the fraudulent conveyance 
action settlement, the WARN Plaintiffs would have to drop 
their WARN claims. Accordingly, to the extent that the only 
alternative to the settlement was a Chapter 7 liquidation, that 
reality was, at least in part, a product of appellees’ own 
making. 
 
 More fundamentally, I find the settlement at odds with 
the goals of the Bankruptcy Code. One of the Code’s core 
goals is to maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate, see 
Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 163 (1991), and it is the duty 
of a bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession to work 
toward that goal, including by prosecuting estate causes of 
action,1 see Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 352 (1985); Official Comm. of 
Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 
F.3d 548, 573 (3d Cir. 2003). The reason creditors’ 
                                              
1 Of course, it was the creditors’ committee, rather than 
a bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession, who was 
responsible for prosecuting the fraudulent conveyance action 
here.  
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committees may bring fraudulent conveyance actions on 
behalf of the estate is that such committees are likely to 
maximize estate value; “[t]he possibility of a derivative suit 
by a creditors’ committee provides a critical safeguard against 
lax pursuit of avoidance actions [by a debtor-in-possession].” 
Cybergenics, 330 F.3d at 573. The settlement of estate causes 
of action can, and often does, play a crucial role in 
maximizing estate value, as settlements may save the estate 
the time, expense, and uncertainties associated with litigation. 
See Protective Comm. for Ind. Stockholders of TMT Trailer 
Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424 (1968) (“In 
administering reorganization proceedings in an economical 
and practical manner it will often be wise to arrange the 
settlement of claims as to which there are substantial and 
reasonable doubts.”); In re A&C Props., 784 F.2d 1377, 
1380-81 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The purpose of a compromise 
agreement is to allow the trustee and the creditors to avoid the 
expenses and burdens associated with litigating sharply 
contested and dubious claims.”). Thus, to the extent that a 
settlement’s departure from the Code’s priority scheme was 
necessary to maximize the estate’s overall value, I would not 
object.  
 
But here, it is difficult to see how the settlement is 
directed at estate-value maximization. Rather, the settlement 
deviates from the Code’s priority scheme so as to maximize 
the recovery that certain creditors receive, some of whom (the 
unsecured creditors) would not have been entitled to recover 
anything in advance of the WARN Plaintiffs had the estate 
property been liquidated and distributed in Chapter 7 
proceedings or under a Chapter 11 “cramdown.” There is, of 
course, a substantial difference between the estate itself and 
specific estate constituents. The estate is a distinct legal 
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entity, and, in general, its assets may not be distributed to 
creditors except in accordance with the strictures of the 
Bankruptcy Code.2  
 
 In this sense, then, the settlement and structured 
dismissal raise the same concern as transactions invalidated 
under the sub rosa plan doctrine. In In re Braniff Airways, 
Inc., 700 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1983), the Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit rejected an asset sale that “had the practical 
effect of dictating some of the terms of any future 
reorganization plan.” Id. at  940. The sale was impermissible 
because the transaction “short circuit[ed] the requirements of 
Chapter 11 for confirmation of a reorganization plan by 
establishing the terms of the plan sub rosa in connection with 
a sale of assets.” Id. “When a proposed transaction specifies 
terms for adopting a reorganization plan, ‘the parties and the 
district court must scale the hurdles erected in Chapter 11.’” 
                                              
2 This point is reinforced with an analogy to trust law. 
Where there are two or more beneficiaries of a trust, the 
trustee is under a duty to deal with them impartially, and 
cannot take an action that rewards certain beneficiaries while 
harming others. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 183 (1959); 
see also Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 514 (1996) 
(“The common law of trusts recognizes the need to preserve 
assets to satisfy future, as well as present, claims and requires 
a trustee to take impartial account of the interests of all 
beneficiaries.”). Yet that is what the Committee did here. This 
duty persists even where the trustee is a beneficiary of the 
trust himself, like the creditors’ committee was here. See 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 32 (2003) (“A natural person, 
including a settlor or beneficiary, has capacity . . . to 
administer trust property and act as trustee . . . .”) 
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In re Cont’l Air Lines, Inc., 780 F.2d 1223, 1226 (5th Cir. 
1986) (quoting Braniff, 700 F.2d at 940). Although the 
combination of the settlement and structured dismissal here 
does not, strictly speaking, constitute a sub rosa plan — the 
hallmark of such a plan is that it dictates the terms of a 
reorganization plan, and the settlement here does not do so — 
the broader concerns underlying the sub rosa doctrine are at 
play. The settlement reallocated assets of the estate in a way 
that would not have been possible without the authority 
conferred upon the creditors’ committee by Chapter 11 and 
effectively terminated the Chapter 11 case, but it failed to 
observe Chapter 11’s “safeguards of disclosure, voting, 
acceptance, and confirmation.” In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 
1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1982); see also In re Biolitec Inc., No. 
13-11157, 2014 WL 7205395, at *8 (Bankr. D.N.J. Dec. 17, 
2014) (rejecting settlement and structured dismissal that 
assigned rights and interests but did not allow parties to vote 
on settlement’s provisions in part because it “resemble[d] an 
impermissible sub rosa plan”). This settlement then appears 
to constitute an impermissible end-run around the carefully 
designed routes by which a debtor may emerge from Chapter 
11 proceedings. 
 
 Critical to this analysis is the fact that the money paid 
by the secured creditors in the settlement was property of the 
estate. A cause of action held by the debtor is property of the 
estate, see Bd. of Trs. of Teamsters Local 863 v. Foodtown, 
Inc., 296 F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 2002), and “proceeds . . . of 
or from property of the estate” are considered estate property 
as well, 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6). Here, the administrative and 
unsecured creditors received the $3.7 million as consideration 
for the releases from the fraudulent conveyance action, so this 
payment qualifies as “proceeds” from the estate’s cause of 
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action.3 See Black’s Law Dictionary 1325 (9th ed. 2009) 
(defining proceeds as “[s]omething received upon selling, 
exchanging, collecting, or otherwise disposing of collateral”); 
see also Strauss v. Morn, Nos. 97-16481 & 97-16483, 1998 
WL 546957, at *3 (9th Cir. 1998) (“§ 541(a)(6) mandates the 
broad interpretation of the term ‘proceeds’ to encompass all 
proceeds of property of the estate”); In re Rossmiller, No. 95-
1249, 1996 WL 175369, at *2 (10th Cir. 1996) (similar). This 
case is thus distinguishable from the so-called “gifting” cases 
such as In re World Health Alternatives, 344 B.R. 291 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2006), and In re SPM Manufacturing Corp., 
984 F.2d 1305 (1st Cir. 1993). In fact, those courts explicitly 
distinguished estate from non-estate property, and approved 
the class-skipping arrangements only because the proceeds 
being distributed were not estate property. See World Health, 
344 B.R. at 299-300; SPM, 984 F.3d at 1313. The 
arrangement here is closer to a § 363 asset sale where the 
proceeds from the debtor’s assets are distributed directly to 
certain creditors, rather than the bankruptcy estate. Cf. In re 
Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting, in 
upholding a § 363 sale, that the bankruptcy court 
                                              
3 On June 30, 2006, Sun acquired Jevic in a leveraged 
buyout, which included an $85 million revolving credit 
facility from a bank group led by CIT. The fraudulent 
conveyance action complaint sets forth that Jevic and Sun 
allegedly knew that Jevic would default on the CIT financing 
agreement by September 11 of that year. The fraudulent 
conveyance action sought over $100 million in damages, and 
the unsecured creditors’ committee alleged that “[w]ith CIT’s 
active assistance . . . Sun orchestrated a[n] . . . LBO whereby 
Debtors’ assets were leveraged to enable a Sun affiliate to pay 
$77.4 million . . . with no money down.”  
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demonstrated “proper solicitude for the priority between 
creditors and deemed it essential that the [s]ale in no way 
upset that priority”), vacated as moot, 592 F.3d 370. It is 
doubtful that such an arrangement would be permissible.  
 
 The majority likens the deviation in this case to the 
first deviation in Iridium, in which the settlement would 
initially distribute funds to the litigation trust instead of the 
Motorola administrative creditors. For two reasons, however, 
I find this analogy unavailing. First, it is not clear to me that 
the Second Circuit saw the settlement’s initial distribution of 
funds to the litigation trust as a deviation from the Code’s 
priority scheme at all. As the Second Circuit explained, if the 
litigation was successful, the majority of the proceeds from 
that litigation would actually flow back to the estate, then to 
be distributed in accordance with the Code’s priority scheme. 
459 F.3d at 462.4 Second, the critical (and, in my view, 
determinative) characteristic of the settlement in this case is 
that it skips over an entire class of creditors. That is precisely 
what the second “deviation” in Iridium did, and the Second 
Circuit remanded to the bankruptcy court for further 
consideration of that aspect of the settlement.  
 
 In fact, the second “deviation” in Iridium deviated 
from the priority scheme in a more minor way than the 
settlement at issue here. In Iridium, the settlement would have 
deviated from the priority scheme only in the event that 
Motorola, an administrative creditor and a defendant in 
various litigation matters brought by the creditors’ committee, 
had prevailed in the litigation or if its administrative claims 
                                              
4  Here, by contrast, none of the settlement proceeds 
flowed to the estate.  
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had exceeded its liability in the litigation. Iridium, 478 F.3d at 
465. The Second Circuit thus characterized this aspect of the 
settlement as a mere “possible deviation” in “one regard,” but 
nevertheless remanded for the bankruptcy court to assess the 
“possible” deviation’s justification. Id. at 466. Here, of 
course, it is clear that the settlement deviates from the priority 
scheme, as it provides no compensation for an entire class of 
priority creditors, while providing $1.7 million to the general 
unsecured creditors.  
 
  Finally, I do not question the factual findings made by 
the bankruptcy court. That court found that there was “no 
realistic prospect” of a meaningful distribution to Jevic’s 
unsecured creditors apart from the settlement under review. 
But whether there was a realistic prospect of distribution to 
the unsecured creditors in the absence of this settlement is not 
relevant to my concerns. What matters is whether the 
settlement’s deviation from the priority scheme was necessary 
to maximize the value of the estate. There is a difference 
between the estate and certain creditors of the estate, and 
there has been no suggestion that the deviation maximized the 
value of the estate itself.  
 
The able bankruptcy court here was faced with an 
unpalatable set of alternatives. But I do not believe the 
situation it faced was entirely sui generis. It is not unusual for 
a debtor to enter bankruptcy with liens on all of its assets, nor 
is it unusual for a debtor to enter Chapter 11 proceedings — 
the flexibility of which enabled appellees to craft this 
settlement in the first place — with the goal of liquidating, 
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rather than rehabilitating, the debtor.5 It is also not difficult to 
imagine another secured creditor who wants to avoid 
providing funds to priority unsecured creditors, particularly 
where the secured creditor is also the debtor’s ultimate parent 
and may have obligations to the debtor’s employees. 
Accordingly, approval of the bankruptcy court’s ruling in this 
case would appear to undermine the general prohibition on 
settlements that deviate from the Code’s priority scheme. 
 
 I recognize that if the settlement were unwound, this 
case would likely be converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation in 
                                              
5 See Ralph Brubaker, The Post-RadLAX Ghosts of 
Pacific Lumber and Philly News (Part II): Limiting Credit 
Bidding, Bankr. L. Letter, July 2014, at 4 (describing the 
“ascendancy of secured credit in Chapter 11 debtors’ capital 
structures, such that it is now common that a dominant 
secured lender has blanket liens on substantially all of the 
debtor’s assets securing debts vastly exceeding the value of 
the debtor’s business and assets”); Kenneth M. Ayotte & 
Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control & Conflict in Chapter 
11, 1 J.L. Analysis 511, 519 (2009) (finding that secured 
claims exceeded the value of the company in twenty-two 
percent of the bankruptcies surveyed); Stephen J. Lubben, 
Business Liquidation, 81 Am. Bankr. L.J. 65 (2007) (noting 
that although “chapter 7 is the prevailing method of business 
liquidation, . . .  a sizable number of firms first attempt either 
a reorganization or liquidation under chapter 11”); 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1123(b)(4) (providing that a chapter 11 plan may “provide 
for the sale of all or substantially all of the property of the 
estate, and the distribution of the proceeds of such sale among 
holders of claims or interests”). 
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which the secured creditors would be the only creditors to 
recover. Accordingly, I would not unwind the settlement 
entirely. Instead, I would permit the secured creditors to 
retain the releases for which they bargained and would not 
disturb any of the proceeds received by the administrative 
creditors either. But I would also require the bankruptcy court 
to determine the WARN Plaintiffs’ damages under the New 
Jersey WARN Act, as well as the proportion of those 
damages that qualifies for the wage priority.6 I would then 
have the court order any proceeds that were distributed to 
creditors with a priority lower than that of the WARN 
Plaintiffs disgorged, and apply those proceeds to the WARN 
Plaintiffs’ wage priority claim. To the extent that funds are 
left over, I would have the court redistribute them to the 
remaining creditors in accordance with the Code’s priority 
scheme.  
                                              
6 At this point, the WARN litigation has largely 
concluded, with the WARN Plaintiffs having established 
liability on their New Jersey WARN claims against Jevic but 
having lost on all other claims. On May 10, 2013, the 
bankruptcy court dismissed the WARN Plaintiffs’ claims 
against Sun (but not Jevic) on the grounds that Sun was not a 
“single employer” for purposes of the WARN Acts. The 
district court affirmed that decision on September 29, 2014. 
In re Jevic Holding Corp., No. 13-1127-SLR, 2014 WL 
4949474 (D. Del. Sept. 29, 2014). In a separate opinion on 
May 10, 2013, the bankruptcy court dismissed the federal 
WARN Act claims against Jevic, but granted summary 
judgment in favor of the WARN Plaintiffs against Jevic on 
their New Jersey WARN Act claims. No appeal was taken of 
that ruling; in fact, Jevic did not contest liability on the New 
Jersey WARN Act claims.  
